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REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY AND FIRST AMENDMENT
EXCEPTIONS
Andrew Koppelman*
People are marvelously inventive in devising new ways to hurt each other.
Some of these new ways involve speech. The Supreme Court has recently
declared that speech is protected by the First Amendment unless it is a type of
communication that has traditionally been unprotected. If this is the law, then
harms will accumulate and the law will be helpless to remedy them.
A recent illustration is the new phenomenon of “revenge pornography”—
the online posting of sexually explicit photographs without the subject’s
consent, usually by rejected ex-boyfriends. The photos are often accompanied
by the victim’s name, address, phone number, Facebook page, and other
personal information. They are sometimes shared with other websites, viewed
by thousands of people, and become the first several pages of hits that a search
engine produces for the victim’s name. The photos are emailed to the victim’s
family, friends, employers, fellow students, or coworkers. They are seen on the
Internet by prospective employers and customers. Victims have been subjected
to harassment, stalking, and threats of sexual assault. Some have been fired
from their jobs. Others have been forced to change schools. The pictures
sometimes follow them to new jobs and schools. The pictures’ availability can
make it difficult to find new employment. Most victims are female.1
Twenty-six states have passed laws prohibiting this practice, and others are
considering them.2 (Civil remedies are often available but have not been much
*
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1 See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 345, 350–54 (2014).
2 State Revenge Porn Laws, C.A. GOLDBERG (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.cagoldberglaw.com/stateswith-revenge-porn-laws/; 26 States Have Revenge Porn Laws, END REVENGE PORN,
http://www.endrevengeporn.org/revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). The United Kingdom also
recently enacted a criminal statute, and there have already been convictions. Liz Hull & Stephanie Linning,
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of a deterrent: victims often cannot afford to sue, and perpetrators often have
few assets to collect.3) The constitutionality of such laws is uncertain,
however.
These laws restrict speech on the basis of its content. Content-based
restrictions (unless they fall within one of the categories of unprotected speech)
are invalid unless necessary to a compelling state interest.4 The state’s interest
in prohibiting revenge pornography, so far from being compelling, may not
even be one that the state is permitted to pursue. The central harm that such a
prohibition aims to prevent is the acceptance, by the audience of the speech, of
the message that this person is degraded and appropriately humiliated because
she once displayed her naked body to a camera. The harm, in other words,
consists in the acceptance of a viewpoint. Viewpoint-based restrictions on
speech are absolutely forbidden.5
There are exceptions to the ban on content-based restrictions: the Court has
held that the First Amendment does not protect incitement, threats, obscenity,
child pornography, defamation of private figures, criminal conspiracies, and
criminal solicitation, for example.6 None of those exceptions is applicable here.
The pathologies of revenge pornography I have just described are the
product of entirely new technologies: digital photography and the Internet.
Because it is so new, however, it is not a category of speech that has
traditionally been denied First Amendment protection. The Court has recently
announced that unless speech falls into such a category, it is fully protected.
There can be no new categories of unprotected speech.
Laws prohibiting revenge pornography thus violate the First Amendment as
the Court now understands it. The crux of the problem is the Court’s
announced unwillingness to create new categories of non-protection.

Thug Becomes the First Person in Britain Jailed for ‘Revenge Porn’ After Posting Intimate Picture of His
Ex-girlfriend on WhatsApp, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 14, 2014, 6:58 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2834509/Thug-person-Britain-jailed-revenge-porn-posting-intimate-picture-ex-girlfriend-WhatsApp.html;
Oliver Wheaton, ‘Vindictive’ Boyfriend Avoids Jail for Posting Revenge Porn of Ex-girlfriend, METRO (Dec.
4, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://metro.co.uk/2014/12/04/vindictive-boyfriend-avoids-jail-for-posting-revenge-pornof-ex-girlfriend-4974272/.
3 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 121–23 (2014); Citron & Franks, supra note
1, at 349.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 11–14.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 24–51.
6 See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 57–146 (3d ed. 2010).
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That unwillingness is not a necessary inference from the First Amendment.
The present exceptions to free speech protection are judge-made doctrines. The
courts that made them are by the same authority free to construct additional
exceptions. Those exceptions would be justified by whatever justified the
exceptions already on the books.
Free speech is a complex cultural formation that aims at a distinctive set of
goods. Its rules must be formulated and reformulated with those specific goods
in mind. Pertinently here, one of those goods is a citizenry with the confidence
to participate in public discussion. Traumatized, stigmatized women are not the
kind of people that a free speech regime aims to create. Revenge pornography
threatens to create a class of people who are chronically dogged by a spoiled
social identity, and a much larger class of people who know that they could be
subjected to such treatment without hope of redress. That state of affairs is
directly contrary to the ideal of a regime in which everyone is empowered to
participate in public discourse.
Part I of this Article examines the constitutional objections to a statute that
bans revenge pornography, and argues that those objections, although they are
firmly rooted in the doctrines laid down by the Supreme Court, rest on an
indefensibly wooden vision of free speech. Part II argues that this vision rests
on an impoverished understanding of liberalism, which does not merely aim at
constraint on government but which affirmatively seeks a society whose
citizens have certain desirable traits of character, notably the courage to
participate in public discourse. I develop this claim with a close reading of
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty. Part III argues that revenge pornography has a
silencing effect on its victims that directly attacks the Millian ideal. Part IV
argues that the creation of free speech exceptions cannot persuasively be ruled
out in the way the Court has done, but are a normal part of judicial
construction of the First Amendment’s text. The Conclusion reflects on the
mechanical character of the free speech rules that the Court has constructed.
I. THE NEW FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
A. Present Doctrine Bars a Remedy
As already noted, there are laws against revenge pornography on the books
in twenty-six states, and more will probably be enacted.7 Although some of
7

See supra note 2.
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these are clumsily drawn,8 it is possible for a law to target revenge
pornography with precision. Danielle Citron has proposed this:
An actor commits criminal invasion of privacy if the actor harms
another person by knowingly disclosing an image of another person
whose intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in a sexual act,
when the actor knows that the other person did not consent to the
disclosure and when the actor knows that the other person expected
that the image would be kept private, under circumstances where the
other person had a reasonable expectation that the image would be
kept private.9

The statute further specifies the terms it uses, so that, for example,
“intimate parts” is defined as “the naked genitals, pubic area, anus, or female
adult nipple.”10 This gives the statute specificity.

8 See First Amendment Lawsuit Challenges Arizona Criminal Law Banning Nude Images, ACLU
(Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/free-speech/first-amendment-lawsuit-challenges-arizona-criminal-lawbanning-nude-images; Ken Paulson, Opinion, Beware Revenge Porn Laws, USA TODAY (Oct. 29, 2014, 8:59
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/10/29/beware-revenge-porn-laws-first-amendment-freespeech-column/18149265/.
9 CITRON, supra note 3, at 152. The first proposal for a statutory ban was by Mary Anne Franks, who
proposed to focus not on the subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy, but on the absence of consent. See
Mary Anne Franks, Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law Response to Revenge Porn, CONCURRING
OPINIONS (Feb. 15, 2013), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/02/why-we-need-a-federal-criminallaw-response-to-revenge-porn.html (prohibiting the disclosure of “a sexually graphic visual depiction of an
individual without that individual’s consent”); Mary Anne Franks, Drafting an Effective “Revenge Porn” Law:
A Guide for Legislators 9 (Aug. 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2468823 (prohibiting disclosure “when the actor knows that or consciously disregarded a
substantial and unjustified risk that the depicted person has not consented to such disclosure”). Franks’s views
on the drafting question have shifted over time, and at one point she considered language like Citron’s. See
Mary Anne Franks, Combating Non-Consensual Pornography: A Working Paper 12 (Oct. 7, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.endrevengeporn.org/main_2013/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/FranksNCP-Working-Paper-10.7.pdf (“Whoever intentionally discloses a photograph, film, videotape, recording, or
any other reproduction of the image of another person whose intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in
an act of sexual contact without that person’s consent, under circumstances in which the person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, commits a crime.”).
I worry that Franks’s statute may be overbroad. There are many situations in which it is reasonable to
disseminate a nude photograph even though the disseminator knows that the depicted person has not consented
to the disclosure. The person may have originally disclosed the photograph with the expectation that it be
public and available for reposting, as when one posts a nude photo of oneself onto a publicly accessible
website. The person may have had no reasonable expectation that the image would be kept private. The person
may not know of the dissemination. The photo may be newsworthy, like the Abu Ghraib photos. The person
may have died before the photo was distributed: some nude photos are more than a century old.
There are likewise reasonable objections to Citron’s language, which has problems of vagueness
(which is what draws Franks to the language of consent), but I bracket them here. The conversation about
appropriate drafting is a continuing one and this Article does not attempt to resolve it.
10 CITRON, supra note 3, at 152.
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It is unlikely that this law would restrict any valuable speech. It is,
however, a content-based restriction on speech. Such restrictions, the Court has
declared, are presumptively unconstitutional.
In Reed v. Gilbert, the Court made preexisting doctrine more rigid by
categorically declaring that “regulation of speech is content based if a law
applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or
message expressed.”11 This implies a presumption of invalidity: “A law that is
content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the
government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus
toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.”12 This works a revolution
in free speech law, calling into question a huge range of government
regulations, such as almost all of securities law.
“The majority opinion in Reed effectively abolishes any distinction
between content regulation and subject-matter regulation,” Judge Frank
Easterbrook observes. “Any law distinguishing one kind of speech from
another by reference to its meaning now requires a compelling justification.”13
If a law is unconstitutional if its restrictions “depend entirely on the
communicative content”14 of what is regulated, then any restriction of revenge
pornography is in deep trouble.
The First Amendment’s protection of free speech does not apply to
“low-value” categories of speech, such as threats and incitement.15 These
categories are exceptions to the otherwise strong protection of speech. This
much is familiar doctrine.
In United States v. Stevens, in which the Court invalidated a law
criminalizing depictions of the illegal killing of animals, Chief Justice Roberts
announced that there would henceforth be no new categories of unprotected
speech:
The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend
only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of
relative social costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects
a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions
11

135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
Id. at 2228 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)).
13 Norton v. City of Springfield, No. 13-3581, 2015 WL 4714073, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 2015).
14 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.
15 See Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. Aguilar, 529 U.S. 1138, 1141 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(using term); FARBER, supra note 6, at 57–146.
12
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on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses
any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some
speech is not worth it. The Constitution is not a document
“prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at
pleasure.”16

Every established exception to free speech protection, Chief Justice Roberts
declared, is based upon “a previously recognized, long-established category of
unprotected speech.”17 Before speech can be regulated, the state must show a
“long-settled tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation.”18 There is no
tradition of regulating dogfighting videos, so the Court invalidated a law that
criminalized them.19
All this is bad news for laws against revenge pornography, even ones as
skillfully drawn as Citron’s. Like the statute in Stevens, a prohibition of
revenge pornography is “presumptively invalid” because it “explicitly
regulates expression based on content.”20
No established exception is likely to be helpful here. Geoffrey Stone
observes that there is “no long-standing tradition of regulating the publication
of non-newsworthy private information.”21 The Court has never addressed the
constitutionality of the tort of disclosure of private facts. Even if the tort is
permissible—it has been around for a long time22—Citron’s statute is different
because it specifies the content of the speech that is restricted. Moreover, the
forbidden content is truthful information, a record of what did in fact occur.
Exposure of that information often leads to unfair treatment of the person
photographed. That is, after all, what the person who distributes the
photograph is hoping to accomplish. But “the ‘fear that people would make

16

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 178
(1803)).
17 Id. at 471.
18 Id. at 469–72.
19 Id. at 482. The Court relied on the same logic (and cited Stevens) in invalidating a ban on sale of
violent video games to minors in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2732, 2734, 2742
(2011).
20 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468.
21 Geoffrey R. Stone, Privacy, the First Amendment, and the Internet, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET:
PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 174, 183 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010).
22 See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure,
53 DUKE L.J. 967, 970–72 (2003). The Stevens Court declared, “Maybe there are some categories of speech
that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our
case law. . . . We need not foreclose the future recognition of such additional categories.” 559 U.S. at 472.
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bad decisions if given truthful information’ cannot justify content-based
burdens on speech.”23
It is even arguable that the proposed statutes are prior restraints on speech,
which are very heavily disfavored, because they require the distributor to
obtain the consent of the person who was photographed. John Humbach
observes that “a law that grants private individuals the absolute discretion,
utterly unconstrained by the democratic process, to totally block dissemination
of disfavored speech creates a system of censorship that would seem to be even
more questionable than one controlled by public officials.”24
The deep problem is viewpoint discrimination. With the animal cruelty
statute at issue in Stevens, the United States noted in its reply brief, Congress
“was concerned about the harms these depictions would cause even if they had
no viewers at all—the harm to living animals occurring in the creation of the
depictions, as well as associated harms arising from these acts of violence.”25
The harm of revenge pornography, on the other hand, occurs only when the
material is made available for viewers. Even worse, it is a harm primarily
because some people believe that the display of one’s naked body to a camera
is shameful. Not everyone has that view.
Another recent Court decision suggests that the state has no power to
remedy harms caused by speech, if the harm consists in the communication of
a viewpoint that the law deems repellent.
In Snyder v. Phelps, the Court ruled that the First Amendment protected the
picketing, with signs such as “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,”
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and “God Hates You,” of the funeral of a
soldier who had been killed in Iraq.26 The Court relied on a well-established
principle: “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is
that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”27 In this case,

23 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670–71 (2011) (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med.
Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002)); see also id. at 2671 (“The choice ‘between the dangers of suppressing
information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available’ is one that ‘the First Amendment makes for
us.’” (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976))).
24 John A. Humbach, How to Write a Constitutional “Revenge Porn” Law, 35 PACE L. REV. 215, 248
(2014).
25 Reply Brief for the United States at 3, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 2564714, at *3.
26 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1214 (2011).
27 Id. at 1219 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
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[A]ny distress occasioned by Westboro’s picketing turned on the
content and viewpoint of the message conveyed, rather than any
interference with the funeral itself. A group of parishioners standing
at the very spot where Westboro stood, holding signs that said “God
Bless America” and “God Loves You,” would not have been
subjected to liability.28

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court explained,
must be subject to First Amendment constraints. A jury is “unlikely to be
neutral with respect to the content of [the] speech.”29 The speech in question
was “certainly hurtful,” but it must be protected “to ensure that we do not stifle
public debate.”30
The Court’s opinion is ambiguous on a crucial point. Was it confessing its
inability to craft a standard that would be confined to the context of funerals?
The implication seems rather to be that even if such a standard could be
devised (and several were proposed),31 it would be improperly
viewpoint-discriminatory to apply it.
Justice Alito, dissenting, emphasized the “acute emotional vulnerability” of
the mourners.32 The trouble is that this vulnerability is itself viewpoint-based.
Justice Elena Kagan observed in an early law review article that a law that
aims to prevent harm is nonetheless impermissibly viewpoint-based when “it is
speech of a certain viewpoint, and only of that viewpoint, which causes the
alleged injury.”33 The protestors’ speech is hurtful only to those who disagree
with their viewpoint—one according to which the death of soldiers in Iraq is a
happy manifestation of divine justice.

28

Id.
Id. (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984) (quoting New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))).
30 Id. at 1220.
31 One could say, for example, that funerals are unique events for free speech purposes, protected despite
their public character. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in Support of
Neither Party Suggesting Reversal at 4, Snyder, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (No. 09-751), 2010 WL 2185135, at *4. (That
is of course in tension with the reasoning of Stevens, then very recently decided, which the amicus did not
cite.) Or one could say that it involves “a privacy right similar to individuals in their homes.” Phelps-Roper v.
Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 364–65 (6th Cir. 2008).
32 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting).
33 Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography After R.A.V., 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 873, 879
(1993).
29
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The Court mentioned repeatedly that the grieving father “could see no more
than the tops of the signs,”34 but this reflects a failure to think through the logic
of its position. How can this be relevant? The Court’s reasoning leaves no
room for a different result if the signs were in plain sight, so long as the protest
“did not itself disrupt that funeral.”35 Absent such interference, did the
protesters have a First Amendment right to communicate with the mourners
during the funeral? Can the law even cognize the fact that the specific intent of
that communication was to inflict pain upon the mourners? What would be the
fate of a law that required protesters to be far enough away to be entirely
invisible to the funeral party?36 Such a law obviously rests on the
viewpoint-based premise that death is not a matter for celebration, and that one
may legitimately exclude from funerals the viewpoint that the deceased
deserved his end.37
If viewpoint discrimination is absolutely forbidden, then certain kinds of
calculated injury to innocents is protected. Restrictions on communication with
mourners are enacted solely to protect them from specific viewpoints with
which the law disagrees. It is only those viewpoints that cause the injury. A
law is content-discriminatory if what it seeks to prevent is “[t]he emotive
impact of speech on its audience.”38 Even a general prohibition of
demonstrations near funerals is covert viewpoint discrimination, because these
specific communications are its avowed target.
“[T]he point of all speech protection . . . is to shield just those choices of
content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.”39 The “in
someone’s eyes” phrase suggests that any restriction of speech because of its
hurtful character partakes of the “inherent subjectiveness” that troubled the
34 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220 (majority opinion); see also id. at 1213–14, 1218; id. at 1221 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
35 Id. at 1220 (majority opinion).
36 The Court expressed no view about the constitutionality of the laws of forty-four states and the federal
government imposing restraints on funeral picketing, but its reasoning throws these into doubt. See id. at 1218;
see also McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2537 (2014) (invalidating as excessively large a
thirty-five-foot buffer zone around abortion clinics).
37 The analogy with the home, for purposes of determining whether there is a captive audience, presents a
similar problem. One can protect the seclusion of the home without regard to viewpoint, but signs in the
vicinity of a funeral are of concern only because of their content. For the same reason, such a restriction is not
purely one of time, place, and manner, because their obvious purpose is to block communication of a specific
unwelcome viewpoint.
38 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
39 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc.,
515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995) (ellipses in original)).
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Court about the legal standard of “outrageousness.”40 In fact, human
experience is less various, and judgment less subjective, than the Court
imagines here: we can confidently predict the emotions felt by parents when
they bury their children.41
The logic of Snyder condemns any law that specifically targets revenge
pornography. Revenge pornography, too, is hurtful only “in someone’s eyes.”
It consists of truthful information—a (typically) undoctored photograph—that
conveys a message that some people—possibly the women depicted, and
certainly some who see the photos—find insulting and discrediting. A law that
specifically prohibits revenge pornography aims at the suppression of that
message. The person who disseminates the photographs wants to persuade his
audience that this woman is a contemptible, worthless slut. The photograph is
offered as evidence to support the claim. Evidently many people are persuaded,
at least to the extent of firing or refusing to employ her. The harm that the law
aims to prohibit consists precisely in the audience’s adoption of the speaker’s
viewpoint.
Free speech law’s suspicion of this kind of viewpoint discrimination is
appropriate. David Strauss has argued that one principle that underlies the
Court’s free speech decisions is the principle that government may not “restrict
speech on the ground that the speech will persuade people to adopt attitudes
that the government considers undesirable.”42 When government violates this
“persuasion principle,” “it is engaged in a form of thought control.”43 Strauss’s
principle is directly implicated here. A prohibition of revenge pornography is
“deliberately denying information to people for the purpose of influencing
their behavior.”44 It is therefore improperly manipulative, “a form of
attempting to control the audience’s mental processes.”45
The objection from the persuasion principle is powerful. A restriction on
revenge pornography aims to manipulate the public. If a woman’s employer,
say, were aware of the existence of this photograph, he would fire her. The law
40

Id.
My analysis of Snyder is indebted at many points to Steven J. Heyman, To Drink the Cup of Fury:
Funeral Picketing, Public Discourse, and the First Amendment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 101 (2012).
42 David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 340
(1991).
43 Id. at 360.
44 Id. at 355.
45 Id. at 356. This is not to say that Strauss is necessarily committed to invalidating a revenge
pornography law. He also argues that his principle can legitimately be violated in order to prevent serious
harms—harms so severe that preventing them would justify manipulative lying. Id. at 360–61.
41
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withholds this information in order to prevent him from forming a mental state
that he would otherwise form.46 This is the deepest reason why a revenge
pornography statute raises serious free speech issues. There is, and should be, a
presumption that such a statute is unconstitutional. Free speech law goes
wrong when it declares that the presumption cannot be overcome.
Can the statute be rescued by the obvious fact that publication of these
photos invades the privacy of their subjects? The Court has declared several
times, albeit in dicta, that the interest in privacy may justify regulation of
communications that do not involve matters of public concern, such as the
conduct of public officials.47 On this basis, some lower courts have upheld
claims for nonconsensual publication of sex videos.48 But the Court has never
said that this interest can justify a law that discriminates on the basis of
content.49 A law that does that is subject to strict scrutiny, and if the interest in
Snyder was not sufficient to withstand such scrutiny—and it was not, precisely
because it was viewpoint-based—then the same result is likely in this
context.50

46 Another purpose of the law is to prevent the embarrassment of having one’s nude photo seen without
one’s consent. This unwanted exposure would be reprehensible even without the collateral consequences I
have been describing. Control over one’s public presentation is an indispensable element of liberty.
See THOMAS NAGEL, Concealment and Exposure, in CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE AND OTHER ESSAYS 3, 4
(2002). It is already protected by the voyeurism statutes that many states have on the books. See NAT’L CTR.
FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, VOYEURISM STATUTES 2009 (Mar. 2009), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/
voyeurism_statutes_mar_09.pdf. But this harm alone would probably not be enough to trigger the wave of
criminal statutes that are now being enacted. Everyone understands that the law aims to prevent other, more
severe harms.
47 See CITRON, supra note 3, at 207–12 (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011)); see also
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Humbach, supra note 24,
at 17 nn.115–16 (collecting cases).
48 CITRON, supra note 3, at 209–10.
49 Humbach, supra note 24, at 240. The torts of invasion of privacy, disclosure of private facts, or
intentional infliction of emotional distress do not facially classify on the basis of content. The Court similarly
held that laws against wiretapping, whose “basic purpose . . . is to ‘protect the privacy of . . .
communications,’” do not discriminate on the basis of content. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526. For this reason,
Humbach thinks that the only constitutionally permissible revenge pornography law would be a general
criminalization of intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress. Humbach, supra note 24, at 252. That
remedy would be massively overbroad and would give no notice that revenge pornography is specifically
prohibited, but Humbach may be correct that it is the best one can do given current free speech doctrine.
50 Another possible rejoinder is that some laws that restrict the communication of truthful but private
information are not even salient for free speech purposes, for example laws protecting the confidentiality of
medical records. The protection of those records, however, is entirely derivative from the fiduciary duties of
health care providers, and only such providers have such obligations. See Colleen K. Sanson, Cause of Action
Against Physician or Other Health Care Practitioner for Wrongful Disclosure of Confidential Patient
Information, 36 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 299, § 8 (2008); Covered Entites and Business Associates, U.S. DEP’T

KOPPELMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

672

2/25/2016 9:24 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:661

Viewpoint-neutrality is an indispensable premise of free speech. If the First
Amendment is to guarantee “freedom for the thought that we hate,” then an
artificial framework must be constructed in which our hatred has no weight.
An alleged harm that is parasitic on viewpoint, that is harmful only “in
someone’s eyes,” is not cognizable as a justification for restricting speech.
These core free speech principles bar a specific, content-based prohibition of
revenge pornography—unless revenge pornography is an unprotected category
of speech.
Citron’s model statute is skillfully drafted to reach only a narrowly defined
subset of speech. It is narrowly tailored, and the interest in question is arguably
compelling. (The Court has never established a criterion for determining what
is a compelling interest.) But if that interest is viewpoint-based, it cannot be
compelling. It is not even permissible.
B. A Mechanical Doctrine
None of this, however, is necessarily a criticism of the rejection of new
unprotected speech categories in Stevens. I have merely been working out its
implications. If this is indeed what the First Amendment means, then that is the
law, like it or not.
But this is not and cannot be what the First Amendment means.
At the threshold, the Court’s claim that—absent narrow exceptions—
content-based restrictions are impermissible is manifestly false. Law is full of
content-based restrictions on speech that are, not so much exceptions to the
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/covered-entities/index.html (last
visited Jan. 10, 2016).
Such laws impose no significant free speech burden because medical records are no part of any
discourse generally recognized as legitimate. The law preserves a settled practice of excluding them from
public discourse. Photos of nude people, on the other hand, are ubiquitous, and any legal presumption that they
are always private would be massively overbroad. One study found that 49% of people use their cell phones to
send or receive sexual content via pictures or text messages. Sext Much? If So, You’re Not Alone, SCI. AM.
(Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/sext-much-if-so-youre-not-alone/. Among eighteento twenty-four-year-olds, the figure is 70%. Study Reveals Majority of Adults Share Intimate Details Via
Unsecured Digital Devices, INTEL SECURITY (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/news/2014/q1/
20140204-01.aspx. In 2012, 15% of adult cell users said they had received a sexual image of someone they
knew, 6% had sent such an image, and 3% had forwarded a sexually suggestive nude or nearly nude photo or
video of someone that they knew. Aaron Smith, The Best (and Worst) of Mobile Connectivity, Part V: Cell
Phone Usage, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/11/30/part-v-cell-phoneusage/. (The “reasonable expectation” of privacy language in the model statute excludes most of this activity
from its reach.) Thanks to Kaylynn Bradley and Mary Anne Franks for raising this analogy, and to Peter
Mayer for these citations.
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First Amendment, but areas in which the Amendment is not even salient. No
free speech issue is raised by prohibitions of perjury, price-fixing, screaming in
the gallery of Congress, and many other things that can be done with
language.51 Contract law consists almost entirely of visiting unwanted
consequences on persons because of words that they have said. If we are to
discern the boundaries of the free speech principle, we must explain why these
are excluded.52
Until recently, one of those areas of nonsalience was copyright law. Like
contract law, copyright has not been an exception to free speech protection so
much as an area in which the First Amendment is not even relevant.53
Copyright is relevant to the revenge pornography question because, if the
photograph in question is one that the victim took of herself, then she owns the
rights to the picture and can force websites to take it down.54 If her
ex-boyfriend took the photo, on the other hand, this recourse is unavailable.
The law mandates dramatically different treatment of images that are
functionally identical, for reasons that have nothing to do either with the
purposes of free speech or the harm in question.55 This pattern is the product of
pure path dependency.
51 Hostile environment sexual harassment, which often consists of slurs and epithets, has not been
deemed by the Court to raise any free speech issue. Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment,
in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 347, 360 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds.,
2004); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog that
Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1. This is unlikely to change even after Reed v. Town of Gilbert. See supra
text and discussion accompanying notes 11–14. “Robert Post, the dean of Yale Law School and an authority
on free speech, said the [Reed] decision was so bold and so sweeping that the Supreme Court could not have
thought through its consequences.” Adam Liptak, Court’s Free-Speech Expansion Has Far-Reaching
Consequences, N.Y. TIMES: SIDEBAR (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/courtsfree-speech-expansion-has-far-reaching-consequences.html. On the ambiguities of free speech law in the
context of hostile environment harassment, see Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech Solution to the Gay
Rights/Religious Liberty Conflict, 110 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
52 See generally Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004).
53 See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 35 (2008); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of
Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2002). The Court’s most recent decisions give
it some weight, but still allow a degree of content-based regulation that would be unconstitutional outside the
context of copyright. Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v.
Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1084–85 (2013).
54 See Amanda Levendowski, Our Best Weapon Against Revenge Porn: Copyright Law?, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/02/our-best-weapon-against-revengeporn-copyright-law/283564/. But see Jeff John Roberts, No, Copyright Is Not the Answer to Revenge Porn,
GIGAOM (Feb. 6, 2014, 7:24 AM), https://gigaom.com/2014/02/06/no-copyright-is-not-the-answer-to-revengeporn/.
55 This problem could be partly remedied by a federal revenge pornography law that included, as one of
the sanctions for a proven violation, the transfer of copyright from the convicted photographer to the victim.
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A similar path dependency is strikingly evident in the exceptions that the
Court recognizes. Stevens involved a statute criminalizing the creation, sale, or
possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty.56 The law aimed to suppress
videos of dogfighting and cockfighting, the sale of which helps to finance
those already illegal activities, and “crush videos”—films that depict the
intentional torture and killing of helpless animals, and are sold to persons who
find such images sexually exciting.57
The law was so broadly worded that it prohibited films of hunting and
bullfighting, and documentaries designed to document the mistreatment of
animals.58 But the Court should not have foreclosed the possibility of a more
narrowly crafted statute.
Congress responded to the Court, but in a pretty arbitrary way. The
arbitrariness was demanded by the restrictions that the Court laid down. The
revised statute prohibits animal cruelty that is obscene59—appealing to the
prurient interest. Since material can be pornographic even when it only appeals
to very specialized tastes, absolutely anything can be “obscene” as long it is
sexually appealing to someone.60 Since the audience for crush videos is
sexually inflected, the revised statute evidently passes muster.61 A nonsexual
taste for cruelty, on the other hand, is excluded from consideration. That taste
exists, and works exist that cater to it, but they are evidently beyond the reach
of the law. The revised statute cannot reach the dogfighting videos that Stevens
distributed.62
That remedy is, however, possible only if a revenge pornography prohibition does not violate the First
Amendment.
56 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 464–65 (2010).
57 Id. at 465–66.
58 Id. at 477–82.
59 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2012).
60 Joel Feinberg observed that, since a work can be obscene if it appeals to the prurient interest of any
small specialized audience (one with unusual paraphilias, for example), “if there are seventeen people in the
entire United States who achieve their sexual gratification primarily by fondling stones, then a magazine aimed
directly at them which publishes lurid color photographs of rocks and pebbles would be obscene.” JOEL
FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 181 (1985). Feinberg observes
that such a magazine would be rescued by the requirement that obscene publications be “offensive.” Id.
Animal torture videos, on the other hand, are offensive, but for reasons that have nothing to do with sex.
61 See United States v. Richards, 755 F.3d 269, 279 (5th Cir. 2014) (upholding revised statute on this
basis).
62 Another problem with reliance upon the category of “obscenity” is that the entire category is based on
assumptions that are now demonstrably preposterous, notably the notion that masturbation destroys a young
person’s health. See HELEN LEFKOWITZ HOROWITZ, REREADING SEX: BATTLES OVER SEXUAL KNOWLEDGE
AND SUPPRESSION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 92–93, 97–107, 394–403 (2002); WALTER KENDRICK,
THE SECRET MUSEUM: PORNOGRAPHY IN MODERN CULTURE 138–43 (1987). The best general history of the
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An even more fundamental problem is that, as Genevieve Lakier has
shown, Stevens misrepresents the history of speech regulation in the United
States. The idea of categories of low-value speech is an invention of the Court
that has been developed since the 1940s. The history the Court deems
dispositive is a history that does not exist.63 The decision about what kind of
speech is unprotected, embodied in present doctrine, cannot be attributed to “a
judgment by the American people.” At the time of the First Amendment’s
enactment, there was remarkably little reflection about what it would mean in
practice.64 That task has been left to judges.65 Modern free speech law is a
product of common-law development, not of text.66

masturbation panic, which began in the early 1700s and survives in attenuated form today, is THOMAS W.
LAQUEUR, SOLITARY SEX: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF MASTURBATION (2003). There is a legitimate continuing
concern about moral harm, but it is not intelligibly confined to sexual material. See Andrew Koppelman, Does
Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635, 1636 (2005) [hereinafter Koppelman, Does
Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?]; Andrew Koppelman, Eros, Civilization, and Harry Clor, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 855, 857 (2007). The immunity of dogfighting videos is a striking illustration.
63 See generally Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166 (2015)
(arguing history has never been the basis for determining when the First Amendment protections apply).
64 See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 191 (1985).
65 The idea that a constitutional provision incorporates traditional exceptions is not original with the
Stevens Court. It was laid down in 1897 in Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897), in which a divided
Court upheld against a Thirteenth Amendment challenge a statute authorizing the forcible return of deserting
seamen to their vessels. Justice Brown, writing for the Court, explained that
the first ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were not
intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain
guaranties and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had
from time immemorial been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the
necessities of the case. In incorporating these principles into the fundamental law there was no
intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they had been
formally expressed.
Id. at 281. This reading of constitutional rights was cited by the Court as a reliable guide to the interpretation
of the First Amendment in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
affirmance); see also id. at 534; id. at 571 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Frohwerk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919)). But Dennis has since been discredited. See THOMAS I. EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 112–21 (1970); HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 190–210 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF
PERSECUTION: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE MCCARTHY ERA 80–106 (2005). And so has Robertson. See
Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 480,
523–26 (1990). The notion of “services which have from time immemorial been treated as exceptional” has
generally been neglected by the Supreme Court and has not been much relied on by the lower courts, probably
because it simply makes no sense; how can there be an exception that antedates the rule? Justice Harlan,
dissenting in Robertson, observed that the reliance on established usage was misplaced, since “the clear
reading of a constitutional provision relating to the liberty of man [was] departed from in deference to what is
called usage which has existed, for the most part, under monarchical and despotic governments.” Robertson,
165 U.S. at 302. Here, as in another, better known Civil War Amendments case, Harlan’s lone dissent seems to
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A better account of First Amendment exceptions has been offered by Elena
Kagan, in an article written before she became a Justice. Kagan observed that
the nonprotection of some kinds of speech represents a contestable value
judgment, and may even involve viewpoint discrimination.67 The category of
unprotected obscenity, for example, restricts “a single (disfavored) viewpoint
about sexual matters,” and “invokes community standards of offensiveness.”68
The viewpoint discrimination rests on the view that “only the restricted ideas
cause great harm and have sparse value.”69 Nonetheless, “partly because of the
long-established nature of the category, such regulation may give rise to fewer
concerns of compromising First Amendment principles.”70 Slippery slope and
chilling effect arguments are predictive. If the prediction has been falsified by
experience, then these concerns are ameliorated. “A long tradition of
regulating a particular category of low value speech,” a law professors’ brief in
Stevens observed, “creates a historical understanding of the contours and
definition of the category and demonstrates from experience that the category
can be regulated without doing undue damage to the First Amendment.”71 The
Stevens Court cited “historic and traditional categories long familiar to the
bar,”72 but it took the existence of these as evidence for its bogus historical
narrative when it is really just an aid to judicial construction.
have prevailed over Brown’s majority opinion. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 537–52 (1896); id. 552–
64 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Yet Robertson’s reasoning continues to shape the First Amendment. The principal
difference between the cases is that in Robertson the history was not fake.
66 See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 51–76 (2010).
67 See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 473 (1996).
68 Id. at 473 n.166.
69 Kagan, supra note 33, at 899.
70 Id. at 897. Kagan, as Solicitor General, proposed the balancing test that was rejected by the Court in
Stevens.
The difference between Kagan’s article and her position in her brief for the United States is that in the
latter, she did not even concede a strong presumption against new categories. Instead, she declared that speech
can be regulated on the basis of its content whenever “the First Amendment value of the speech is ‘clearly
outweighed’ by its societal costs.” Brief for the United States at 12, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460
(2010) (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 1615365, at *12 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)). The explanation of the difference could be the breadth of the statute she was obligated to defend. The
law was so loosely worded that it prohibited films of hunting and bullfighting, and documentaries designed to
document the mistreatment of animals. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 477–82. She may have judged that only a broad
balancing test could sustain that statute. In Reed v. Gilbert, she endorsed a milder proposition: “We can
administer our content-regulation doctrine with a dose of common sense, so as to leave standing laws that in
no way implicate its intended function.” 135 S. Ct. at 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment).
71 Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars Bruce Ackerman et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent
at 5–6, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 2331222, at *5–6.
72 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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It is puzzling why Chief Justice Roberts declared the shape of the law fixed
for all time and then attributed that decision to the Framers. None of the briefs,
not even the ones that directly attacked the government’s proposed balancing
test,73 proposed anything as wooden and ahistorical as that.
The Stevens Court was wrong to disclaim “a freewheeling authority to
declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.”74
The Court has always had, and has often exercised, that authority. The question
is how it ought to exercise it.
II. FREE SPEECH RECONSIDERED
A. Misrepresenting Liberalism
The concepts of viewpoint discrimination and low-value speech are judicial
constructs. The Court crafted them in an effort to implement the vague
command of the First Amendment. It would be ridiculous to protect everything
that is done with words, so it is necessary to draw lines.75 If courts did it in the
past, there is no reason why they cannot do it now. So how should a court
proceed? How should it respond to a proposal to add a new category of
unprotected speech?
To answer that question, we need to begin with the salience question. We
need to know why we are protecting speech at all. That will inform us which
speech we should especially concern ourselves with. And that in turn will
inform us which exceptions we can allow.
Modern free speech theory is dominated, in the courts and the academy
alike, by a style of reasoning that posits a few axiomatic purposes of speech—
“It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
73 In addition to the Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars, see Brief of Amici Curiae Association of
American Publishers, Inc. et al. at 11, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 2331225, at *11; Brief
for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 16–28, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (No. 08769), 2009 WL 2331221, at *16–28; Brief of the DKT Liberty Project, The American Civil Liberties Union,
and The Center for Democracy and Technology, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4–13, Stevens,
559 U.S. 460 (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 2247129, at *4–13; Brief of First Amendment Lawyers Association as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 9–10, 15–18, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (No. 08-769), 2009 WL
2331224, at *9–10, *15–18; Brief Amici Curiae of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and
Thirteen News Media Organizations in Support of Respondent at 20–22, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (No. 08-769),
2009 WL 2219305, at *20–22.
74 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472.
75 See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001).
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marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”76 “The right to
speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of
the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”77 “The right of citizens
to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a
precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect
it”78—from these axioms one deduces detailed rules of law, and deems
irrelevant any consequences that were not taken account of in that deduction.
These slogans mask many difficulties.79 Pertinently here, they exclude ideals
from consideration. Ideals are central to the free speech tradition.
Liberalism sometimes presents itself as what Brian Barry called a
“want-regarding” theory, which tries to satisfy people’s wants and goals,
whatever they are.80 This is contrasted with “ideal-regarding theories,” which
aim to achieve human excellence whether or not people subjectively happen to
want it. Some liberal theorists reject any reliance on ideal-regarding theory.81
A free society, so goes the story, has no ideals of virtue or personal character:
it leaves people free to pursue whatever ends they think appropriate, giving
them all-purpose means and freedoms with which to do so.82 The right to free
speech is sometimes understood as one such all-purpose freedom.
That story misrepresents liberalism, which in fact is intensely
ideal-regarding. Its covert ideal-regarding character is perhaps clearest in the
most abstemious want-regarding formulation, that of utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism aims to gratify whatever preferences people actually have,
leaving them free to prefer whatever ends they find attractive. For any person
to pursue general utility as an end however is an extraordinarily demanding
76

Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 637 (1943)).
78 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
79 See Andrew Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance: Tunnel Constructivism in Free Speech Theory, 107 NW.
U. L. REV. 647 (2013).
80 BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 38–41 (1965).
81 See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 65–70
(1984). For critique, see Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, supra note 62, at 1642–43. Rawls,
on the other hand, makes clear that his theory of justice is ideal-regarding because it does not hold that all
satisfactions are of equal value. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 326 (1971). Rawls’s ideal, however, is
more abstract than the one I discuss here, and its abstractness has costs. See Andrew Koppelman, The Limits of
Constructivism: Can Rawls Condemn Female Genital Mutilation?, 71 REV. POL. 459 (2009).
82 Or if there are such virtues, they are merely instrumental ones: the traits of character that citizens must
have if a liberal society is to function. See generally EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL
EDUCATION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1997); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE,
AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990).
77
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task, requiring that I give as much weight to the happiness of others as I do to
my own. If I am to pursue a utilitarian policy, I may have to endure the
frustration of my own preferences. Utilitarianism cannot explain why I should
do that. An intense and demanding benevolence is built into its formulations
from the start.83
B. Millian Idealism
A canonical statement of the free speech tradition’s ideal-regarding aspect
is John Stuart Mill’s 1859 book On Liberty.84 I will examine Mill’s
formulation in some detail. It is impossible to demonstrate in this short Article
that an entire tradition is ideal-regarding. On Liberty is however probably the
most influential defense of free speech ever written. Its reliance on a character
ideal, and its capacity to make that ideal attractive to its readers, is an
important source of that influence.85
The liberty that Mill wants to defend not only encompasses “liberty of
expressing and publishing opinions” but also
liberty of tastes and pursuits, of framing the plan of our life to suit
our own character, of doing as we like, subject to such consequences
as may follow, without impediment from our fellow creatures, so
long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should
think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong.86

The protection of speech is an exception to his principle that the state may
interfere with liberty only to prevent harm to others: almost all speech is
83

See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 31 (1989).
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859).
85 It is what is generally meant by the familiar “marketplace of ideas,” though that term is more
commonly associated with Oliver Wendell Holmes. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes’s idea of free speech avoids any reliance on ideals, but for that reason it is
likely, on close examination, to be strange to contemporary readers. See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the
Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 45. For other examinations of the role of a character ideal in the
justification of free speech, see generally Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to
Brandeis to the Present, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 60 (Lee C. Bollinger &
Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) [hereinafter Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character]; LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE
TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); JOHN DURHAM
PETERS, COURTING THE ABYSS: FREE SPEECH AND THE LIBERAL TRADITION (2005). It is possible to
reformulate Mill’s argument in a way that excludes such considerations. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Freedom of
Expression, in TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE 173, 188 (David Heyd ed., 1996); Gerald F. Gaus, State
Neutrality and Controversial Values in On Liberty, in MILL’S ON LIBERTY: A CRITICAL GUIDE 83, 84 (C.L.
Ten ed., 2008). Such reformulations lose in rhetorical power more than they gain in theoretical parsimony.
86 MILL, supra note 84, at 71.
84
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protected even when it is harmful. But the exception is derived from the same
commitments that generate the broader protection of liberty.
All this sounds want-regarding, and has often been taken to be so. The
basis of these claims, however, is ideal-regarding.
Mill’s primary reason for demanding this broad liberty is an ideal of
individuality. Every individual has an obligation to respond to an inwardly felt
calling, which if courageously pursued will bring him closer to the ultimate
good. Free speech and freedom of conduct are valuable as means, because they
smooth the path toward this ideal.87
Society needs “open, fearless characters.”88 Mill cares about the capacity to
grasp truth inwardly, not just by outward show. He values “the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with
error.”89 If the reasons for even a true opinion are held without understanding
the arguments both for and against it, “it will be held as a dead dogma, not a
living truth.”90 Truth held dogmatically “is but one superstition the more,
accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth.”91 The pursuit
matters more than the attainment: “Truth gains more even by the errors of one
who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself than by the true
opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to
think.”92 Mill thinks that the moral distress of contemplating ways of life
antithetical to your own is good for you.93 “[T]he most important point of
excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue
and intelligence of the people themselves . . . .”94 Freedom is good because it
produces better people:
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in
themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits
87

See FRED R. BERGER, HAPPINESS, JUSTICE, AND FREEDOM: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

OF JOHN STUART MILL 271–74 (1984).
88 MILL, supra note 84, at 94.
89

Id. at 76.
Id. at 97.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 95.
93 See JEREMY WALDRON, Mill and the Value of Moral Distress, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED
PAPERS 1981–1991, at 115 (1993).
94 JOHN STUART MILL, Considerations on Representative Government, reprinted in ESSAYS ON POLITICS
AND SOCIETY, COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL vol. XIX 390 (John M. Robson ed., 1996). The
importance of ideals of virtue in Mill is explored in PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
LIBERALISM 134–69 (1999).
90
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imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings
become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the
works partake the character of those who do them, by the same
process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating,
furnishing more abundant ailment to high thoughts and elevating
feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the
race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to.95

As John Durham Peters observes, Mill’s ideal of character is an unstable
mix of stoicism and romanticism. As listeners, citizens must be willing to
subject their dearest beliefs to challenge and criticism, and learn to articulate
views the opposite of their own. Yet as speakers, they must present their ideas
powerfully and with conviction.96
The valuable character traits promoted by a regime of free speech have a
negative counterpart in the malign effects of censorship. “The greatest harm
done is to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is
cramped and their reason cowed by the fear of heresy.”97 The consequence is
“a low, abject, servile type of character,”98 whose “human capacities are
withered and starved.”99 Mill bombards it with nasty metaphors: automatons in
human form, apes, cattle, sheep; a “stagnant pool.”100 The rhetorical aim is to
make the reader see the value of the kind of character that Mill prizes. Alan
Ryan observes that On Liberty “does not so much lay out logically compelling
arguments as depict a type of character to which one can react favourably or
unfavourably.”101
One of the central character traits that concern Mill is the “moral courage
of the human mind.”102 He feared “social tyranny more formidable than many
kinds of political oppression,” which “leaves fewer means of escape,
penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul
95 MILL, supra note 84, at 127. The same theme is apparent in his essay The Subjection of Women, which
condemns “the dull and hopeless life to which [society] often condemns them, by forbidding them to exercise
the practical abilities which many of them are conscious of, in any wider field than one [childrearing] which to
some of them never was, and to others is no longer, open.” JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN
99–100 (M.I.T. Press 1970) (1869).
96 PETERS, supra note 85, at 130–36.
97 MILL, supra note 84, at 95.
98 Id. at 114.
99 Id. at 126.
100 Id. at 129.
101 ALAN RYAN, J. S. MILL 141 (1974). For a similar reading of Mill, see ISAIAH BERLIN, John Stuart Mill
and the Ends of Life, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 173 (1969).
102 MILL, supra note 84, at 94.
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itself.”103 This could only be prevented by a shared understanding of the value
of individuality and choice. “Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere
of freedom.”104
C. The Persistence of the Ideal
I have focused on Mill, whose statement of his ideal is unusually well
developed and influential, but he is hardly idiosyncratic. Similar aspirations
can be found in many of the classic defenders of free speech. Milton thought
that a regime of free speech was valuable because it was a stimulant to an
indispensable spiritual exercise: “Assuredly we bring not innocence into the
world, we bring impurity much rather: that which purifies us is trial, and trial is
by what is contrary.”105 Justice Brandeis thought that free speech was valuable
because it would produce “courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the
power of free and fearless reasoning.”106 He thought it “hazardous to
discourage thought, hope and imagination,” because “the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people.”107 The same theme appears, in somewhat rarefied
form, in contemporary theorists who try to reduce free speech to a single value,
such as democracy, autonomy, or self-realization.108
To some extent, these virtues are instrumentally necessary for democracy
to function.109 But they are not only valued for that reason. As Justice Brandeis
observed, liberty is valuable “both as an end and as a means.”110 These traits of
character are deemed valuable in themselves.
The individual- and democracy-based accounts of free speech complement
one another. Both of them give weight to the views of each individual. All
must be able to participate in public discourse. No one may be silenced.

103

Id. at 63.
Id. at 129.
105 John Milton, Areopagitica, reprinted in COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 728 (Merritt Y. Hughes
ed., 1957); see Vincent Blasi, Milton’s Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment (Yale L. Sch.
Occasional Papers, Paper No. 6, 1995), http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/ylsop/papers/6.
106 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see Blasi, Free Speech and
Good Character, supra note 85, at 78, 84; Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic
Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 668, 670 (1988).
107 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
108 See generally Koppelman, supra note 79 (discussing many of these).
109 See supra note 82.
110 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
104

KOPPELMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

2/25/2016 9:24 AM

REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY

683

We have some experience with an America in which these virtues are
neglected. During our most repressive periods, during the Palmer raids after
World War I and the McCarthy period in the 1950s, the sense of being watched
was pervasive. During the loyalty probes of the latter period, the government
was empowered to decide what thoughts and ideas would be permitted and
which were “disloyal.”111 The consequence was a climate of fear. Everyone
understood that severe punishment could be imposed for the mere holding of
unpopular political positions.112 Its effect was to deprive the electorate of
legitimate political choices.
The ideal is a broadly democratic public discourse in which everyone has
an opportunity to participate in the formation of public opinion. Free speech
law has been shaped by the need for widespread opportunities for expression.
Public fora such as streets and parks must be available for speakers;113 so must
any public forum designated by the state;114 cheap means of communication,
such as handbills or signs in the windows of homes, cannot be prohibited.115
Otherwise valid restrictions on speech may be invalid if they create a chilling
effect on protected speech.116
Free speech is a tradition that is fundamentally concerned with bringing
about a state of affairs in the world: the maintenance of the complex system of
practices and goods that constitutes public discourse. Robert Post observes that
this autonomous sphere of discussion has a specific, collective goal: “to enable
the formation of a genuine and uncoerced public opinion in a culturally
heterogeneous society.”117 That goal shapes the doctrine. “At root, First
Amendment prohibitions against viewpoint and content discrimination express
the essential postulate that all persons within public discourse should be
111

GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798

TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 352 (2004).
112 See REDISH, supra note 65 (discussing
113
114
115

abuses during the McCarthy era).
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939).
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44–46 (1983).
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 45, 58–59 (1994); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164, 165

(1939).
116

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–80

(1964).
117

ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 145 (1995).
The goal is democracy broadly understood, reaching beyond government to popular control of culture. Jack M.
Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information
Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2004). One goal is a kind of mutual transparency. See Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COMMMENT. 283, 285–86, 301–02
(2011).
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equally free to say or not say what they choose.”118 In order to realize that
aspiration, citizens have to have the kind of character that facilitates and
inclines toward participation in that discourse.
Protection of some kinds of speech helps to promote that ideal. Other kinds
of speech are tangential to it, or even irrelevant. That explains the limited
salience of free speech. Contract law, for example, is outside the scope of
protection—it is not even an exception to free speech protection—because it is
not within the sphere of public discourse.
The central ideal-regarding goal of free speech is a distinctive type of
human flourishing, one that cannot occur except in what Mill called “an
atmosphere of freedom.”119 A part of that flourishing is the unquestioned
assumption of one’s right to speak and to play with ideas. Courage is not quite
the right term because it implies that one is aware of danger and has the
fortitude to proceed nonetheless. The state of mind one seeks is rather the
confidence characteristic of young people who have never suffered serious
injury, and who perform impressive and dangerous feats because they
unconsciously, irrationally feel sure that they cannot really be hurt. Speakers
should have the kind of confidence that does not even imagine that their
opinions could get them into trouble with the police. That confidence is
vulnerable.120 When it is attacked, the free speech ideal is a reason for
deploying the law to defend it.
III. REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY AND SILENCING
A paradigmatic antonym to this confidence is the disrupted state of mind
induced by threats. Fear is one of the basic emotions. The mechanism of its
arousal is based in the brain stem, a part of the neurological system we share
118 ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 22 (2012). This is not to unqualifiedly embrace Post’s free speech
theory, see Koppelman, supra note 79, at 677–79, but our differences are not pertinent here.
119 MILL, supra note 84, at 129 (emphasis omitted).
120 The persistent effect of repression is nicely illustrated by this story told by Clancy Sigal, a writer
whose parents were arrested and jailed during the Palmer raids of 1920. Decades later, when FBI agents
arrived to question Sigal about his politics during the cold war, Sigal noted,

[M]y mother politely met them at the door, invited them in for coffee and charmed them out of
their intended purpose. But she was pale and terrified when I got home. In an understandable slip
of the tongue she said: “The Palmers have been here. What have you done?”
Clancy Sigal, Opinion, John Ashcroft’s Palmer Raids, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/03/13/opinion/john-ashcroft-s-palmer-raids.html. Thanks to Bonnie Honig for the reference.
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with reptiles. The anxiety that is triggered can preoccupy a person long after
the danger has disappeared. This is the most fundamental reason why threats
are not protected speech.121 A person in fear is a poor participant in democratic
deliberation. One cannot think about the objects of public discourse because it
is hard to concentrate on anything.
Revenge pornography sometimes has that effect, and is intended to have
that effect.122 “I just feel like I’m now a prime target for actual rape,” one
victim reported. “I never walk alone at night, and I get chills when I catch
someone staring at me. I always wonder to myself, ‘Are they staring at me
because they recognize me from the Internet?’”123 She closed her Facebook
page and LinkedIn profile, withdrew from online activities, and considered
fleeing the job market altogether and starting a business partnership with a
friend who would keep her name out of the marketing materials.124 Other
victims report post-traumatic stress disorder, anorexia nervosa, depression, and
anxiety, which grows more severe over time.125 A common reaction is to try to
make oneself as invisible as possible. Revenge pornography has induced
women to quit their jobs, disappear from the Internet, and move away from
their homes.126
Certain feminist and critical race theorists, arguing for the restriction of
misogynistic pornography and hate speech, have argued that such speech is
antagonistic to free speech values because it silences its targets. This silencing
happens through direct intimidation and by creating a cultural climate that
discredits what women and African Americans have to say.127
These arguments have not been persuasive, and while they are still made,
they are less prominent than they once were. The reason they failed was that,
121 See Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern First Amendment Doctrine,
58 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1339–46 (2006).
122 The question, which the Court recently failed to resolve, whether the fear engendered by a threat, in
order to be unprotected, must be caused intentionally or merely recklessly, thus is not pertinent here, where
both are the case. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004, 2013 (2015).
123 CITRON, supra note 3, at 48.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 10–11.
126 See id. at 1–21, 45–50.
127 See, e.g., RAE LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PORNOGRAPHY AND
OBJECTIFICATION 2, 3–4 (2009); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle’s Sister: Pornography, Civil
Rights, and Speech, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 163–97 (1987); MARI J.
MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 7 (1993). A useful rejoinder is HENRY LOUIS GATES ET AL., SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF
SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1994).
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while free speech theory can hardly be indifferent to silencing when it occurs,
and although such silencing effects are clearly part of the daily experience of
African Americans and women, the advocates of censorship were never able to
establish a persuasive causal nexus between silencing and any particular
speech act. It was impossible to show that any single instance of racist speech
or pornography could have that kind of devastating effect on a person.128
Speech is certainly integral to the problem: racism and sexism are ideas in
people’s heads, and those ideas get transmitted from one generation to the next
by means of language. Antidiscrimination law is necessarily committed to the
reshaping of culture to eliminate or marginalize such malign ideologies.129 But
censorship is the wrong tool for this job. The cost to free speech of a hate
speech prohibition—and there is every reason to think that it would be
substantial130—would not buy much.
Revenge pornography is different. There is a tight causal connection
between speech and harm. A single posting to a website can have a
permanently life-altering effect on its target, imposing a spoiled identity that it
is impossible to ever escape.131
Free speech depends on a willingness to disclose one’s thoughts with no
fear of crushing reprisal. It aims “to ensure that the individual citizen can
effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of
self-government.”132 That aim is thwarted if you protect this speech.
Only a small minority is likely to be placed in this position. But there is
still a free speech problem if the aspiration is to enable everyone to participate

128 Compare Rae Langton, Subordination, Silence, and Pornography’s Authority, in CENSORSHIP AND
SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION 261, 261–83 (Robert C. Post ed., 1998), with the skeptical
response in Leslie Green, Pornographizing, Subordinating, and Silencing, in CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING:
PRACTICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION, supra, at 285, 285–311. See also SPEECH AND HARM: CONTROVERSIES
OVER FREE SPEECH (Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan eds., 2012) (reviewed in Andrew Koppelman,
Book Review, 123 ETHICS 768 (2013)). Catharine MacKinnon claims that her anti-pornography statute would
merely allow “anyone hurt through pornography to prove its role in their abuse.” CATHERINE A. MACKINNON,
ONLY WORDS 92 (1993). That, however, really means that juries would be empowered to do what they like to
producers of pornography. Learned Hand observed long ago that a test for unprotected speech that leaves great
discretion to juries would likely be used improperly to suppress unpopular speech. See Gerald Gunther,
Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 719, 721 (1975).
129 See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 8 (1996).
130 Id. at 220–65.
131 See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963).
132 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
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in public discourse. Part of the legitimating force of public discourse is that
there are low barriers to entry.
I am not claiming that this egalitarianism is a necessary part of any possible
free speech ideal. My claim is historically contingent. In early America, the
audience for books and newspapers was presumptively white, male, and upper
class. Indeed, printing was one of the markers that constituted a specifically
white community.133 A lively debate took place among Southern white
Americans, in the late nineteenth century, over the proposal to disenfranchise
black citizens. The proposal was adopted.134 Many public spheres imply
narrow audiences.
The question is what ideal animates our public sphere. I submit that our
ideal is an egalitarian one. I have not just brought equality into free speech
theory because I happen to like it. It is integral to the prevailing ideal.
What does it mean if the harms of revenge pornography go unredressed?
Criminal law is about equal status in society. If harm to a class of people is
tolerated by the law, then that signifies the inferior status of those who can be
harmed with impunity.135 The state thereby ratifies spoiled identity. If the harm
of revenge pornography is not remediable, it means that the targets are fair
game.
I have been arguing that an important justification of freedom of speech is
an ideal of character. Recognition of that ideal makes possible a response to a
certain postmodern objection to the idea of free speech.136 The objection is that
censorship in some form is inevitable. By constituting limited possibilities of
expression, any social order will generate a pattern of both speech and silence.
Recognition of that fact threatens to enfeeble censorship as a normative
concept.137 There simply is no fact in the world that can be singled out as
133 MICHAEL WARNER, THE LETTERS OF THE REPUBLIC: PUBLICATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 12 (1990).
134 See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 67–109 (3d rev. ed. 1974).
135 Jean Hampton, A New Theory of Retribution, in LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN LAW AND
MORALS 377, 387–88 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1991); Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea,
in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 122 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988); G.W.F. HEGEL,
ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 115–32 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991) (1821); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1679 (1992).
136 For one prominent formulation, see STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND
IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO (1994), further critiqued in Koppelman, supra note 79, at 686–87.
137 Robert C. Post, Censorship and Silencing, in CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURAL
REGULATION, supra note 128, at 1–2.
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censorship. “Censorship” is a conclusion, not a premise; it is the label we place
on the speech restriction that we have decided on other grounds to stigmatize
as wrongful.138
The normative claim can be rehabilitated if one acknowledges, with
Foucault, that power can be productive.139 Free speech is the aspiration to
deploy power to produce a distinctive kind of person in a distinctive kind of
society. It lives up to that aspiration if it succeeds in its productive ambitions—
if it actually produces the kind of people it hopes to produce: people who
measure up to the Mill–Brandeis ideal.140
Revenge pornography is a new problem, and one may wonder whether it
will be persistent enough to justify modifying free speech law. Humbach
speculates that “in a few years’ time, people will look back and wonder what
all the fuss was about—and the sooner it becomes known . . . just how
common it is to take such pictures, the sooner people will stop acting as though
doing so is somehow reprehensible or outré.”141 If he is right, then this
particular type of bad behavior will become increasingly harmless—no more
discrediting than the observation that a married woman sometimes has sex with
her husband. It will no longer damage a woman’s employability or reputation.
I don’t buy it. In a world in which women are pervasively integrated into
professional workplaces, they still have to struggle with a cultural context in
which being sexualized is discrediting. The question of what to wear to work is
far more fraught for women than for men. So is the question of professional
demeanor. Justice Ginsburg observes that the ban on sex discrimination is
violated when “members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
exposed”142—or, as she put it more pithily in oral argument, when “one sex has
to put up with something that the other sex doesn’t have to put up with.”143 If,
however, this is the test, then antidiscrimination law is routinely violated because
women routinely put up with nonsense at work that men do not have to put up
138 Frederick Schauer, The Ontology of Censorship, in CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING: PRACTICES OF
CULTURAL REGULATION, supra note 128, at 147, 160.
139 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 27 (Alan Sheridan trans.,
Vintage Books 1979) (1975).
140 Foucault is suspicious of productive power, but because the exercise of that power is inevitable, a
hermeneutic of unrelieved suspicion leads nowhere. See CHARLES TAYLOR, Foucault on Freedom and Truth,
in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 152 (1985).
141 Humbach, supra note 24, at 230 n.69.
142 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
143 Linda Greenhouse, Ginsburg at Fore in Court’s Give-and-Take, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1993, at A1.
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with. Professional discrediting through sexualization of one’s identity is a prime
example.
This is unlikely to change in our lifetimes. We do not now have a cure for
sexism. It is however a disease that can be managed. The key to managing a
chronic disease is to frankly acknowledge and respect one’s continuing
vulnerabilities. Perhaps we must endure a continuing cultural climate of sexism.
We need not endure a class of notoriously damaged women.
A familiar example is Monica Lewinsky. The smirk that is often elicited by
the mere mention of her name is a powerful marker of her degraded status, years
after her widely publicized affair with President Bill Clinton. “I became a social
representation, a social canvas on which anybody could project their confusion
about women, sex, infidelity, politics, and body issues.”144 She reports the
consequences of that identity in a brief memoir written more than fifteen years
after the Starr Report “included chapter and verse about my intimate sexual
activities.”145 In the years that followed, she found that she either could not get a
job or, in a few cases, she “was right for all the wrong reasons”: a prospective
employer wanted to trade on her notoriety.146 “I eventually came to realize that
traditional employment might not be an option for me.”147 At a taping of a
public Q&A for an HBO documentary, she was asked by an audience member,
“How does it feel to be America’s premier blow-job queen?”148 During Hillary
Clinton’s run for the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination, “I remained
virtually reclusive, despite being inundated with press requests.”149 She has
recently begun to try to craft a new public persona as a public intellectual. But
the only thing anyone wants to hear her talk about is her own narrative of
humiliation. And it took years for her to get where she is now:
Unlike the other parties involved, I was so young that I had no
established identity to which I could return. I didn’t “let this define”
me—I simply hadn’t had the life experience to establish my own
identity in 1998. If you haven’t figured out who you are, it’s hard not
to accept the horrible image of you created by others. (Thus, my
compassion for young people who find themselves shamed on the

144 Monica Lewinsky, Shame and Survival, VANITY FAIR (June 2014), http://www.vanityfair.com/style/
society/2014/06/monica-lewinsky-humiliation-culture.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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Web.) Despite much self-searching and therapy and exploring of
different paths, I remained “stuck” for far too many years.150

Free speech law threatens to reproduce this effect on a massive scale.
The free speech costs of a revenge pornography law are undoubtedly
substantial. The law’s purpose is to suppress a viewpoint: that a specific woman
is deservedly discredited by her sexuality. Sexism is antithetical to liberalism,151
but liberalism generally addresses it by means other than the restriction of
speech. Here, however, there is no other way to do it. The general principles that
appropriately govern free speech law should not govern here.
Revenge pornography produces emotional injury, damages social standing,
and is economically destructive. But it misdescribes the problem to say that
these harms are to be balanced against the imperatives of the liberal political
order. This speech harms the liberal political order by driving some citizens out
of it. The harms of dogfighting, or of visible, nasty signs at funerals are severe,
I think severe enough to justify regulation, but they do not produce harms of
this kind.
IV. HOW TO CARVE OUT EXCEPTIONS
The task of carving out exceptions has a structure that is familiar from the
law of religious accommodation. American law sometimes gives religion
special treatment. Quakers’ and Mennonites’ objections to participation in war
have been accommodated since Colonial times. Sacramental wine was
permitted during Prohibition. Today the Catholic Church is exempted from
antidiscrimination laws when it denies ordination to women. We exempt
people from generally applicable laws when they have sufficiently urgent
reasons (religious scruples have traditionally been held to be such) and the
law’s purposes won’t be thwarted by accommodation.152
When an exception to free speech protection (supposing it already settled
that we are in the realm of free speech salience) is proposed, the courts have to
ask whether the harm in question is sufficiently harmful to modify free speech
150

Id.
See KOPPELMAN, supra note 129, at 115–45.
152 See Andrew Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized Specialness, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 71, 73
(2013), https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/Koppelman%20
Online.pdf; Andrew Koppelman, Nonexistent and Irreplaceable: Keep the Religion in Religious Freedom,
COMMONWEAL MAG. (Mar. 27, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/nonexistentirreplaceable.
151

KOPPELMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

2/25/2016 9:24 AM

REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY

691

doctrine. No formula can help with that step. Harm is a setback to interests,
and there is perpetual contestation about which human interests are important.
The Court has never devised a test for what counts as a compelling state
interest.
Pace the Court, it is not possible to freeze in advance the categories of
harm that call for exceptions. Human vulnerability takes many forms, and no
one can anticipate all of the harmful things that can be accomplished with
speech in the future.
Assessing the degree of harm is inevitably a contestable undertaking. But
one factor must be whether the harm reaches into the area of free speech
salience. Harm that silences a class of speakers has to be taken seriously.
If the harm is serious enough, it next must be asked whether that harm can
be prevented without chilling the “atmosphere of freedom” that free speech
seeks to foster. Even some speech that is antithetical to the liberal order has to
be tolerated. Communists did not believe in free speech, and so it was argued
in the 1950s that their speech should not itself be protected.153 But the
consequence of that non-protection was an atmosphere of fear that reached far
beyond the Communists. Much of the flowering of free speech theorizing in
the 1960s was born of a determination not to repeat that experience.154
That leads us to a lawyer’s question: can the category of unprotected
speech be crafted with sufficient precision that clear notice is given as to which
speech is protected and which is unprotected? Categories of low-value speech
must be “well-defined and narrowly limited.”155 That responds to familiar
concerns of “chilling effect” and “slippery slope.”
If, however, a category of unprotected speech can be crafted with enough
precision, then exceptions to ordinary free speech principles, even the
prohibition of viewpoint discrimination, can be consistent with the broader
purposes of the system of freedom of expression.
A final objection to this kind of exercise is that, even if free speech law is a
judicial construct, its stability and effectiveness depend on extreme judicial
153

Carl A. Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free
Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173, 186–89 (1956).
154 See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
878–93 (1963). This theory is also discussed in Koppelman, supra note 79, at 704–06.
155 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571 (1942)).
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reluctance to carve out new categories of non-protection. Dissenting political
speech has often been regarded as having low value, and if courts took for
granted a power to make exceptions whenever the benefits of censorship
seemed to outweigh the costs, America would be a much more repressive
country. Chief Justice Roberts’s mythical story may be intellectually
indefensible, but it is still better to over-constrain judges than to underconstrain them.
Overconstraint has its costs, however. Free speech doctrine needs to
honestly take account of the harm that speech can sometimes do.156 When the
harm is severe enough, a new exception can be created, as happened with child
pornography.157 There is no way to determine whether the danger of
non-protection of speech outweighs the benefit without considering the
magnitude of the harm at issue.
CONCLUSION
Revenge pornography prohibitions raise a serious free speech problem.
They suppress truthful information, and they do so in order to prevent
audiences from being persuaded, by that information, to form a viewpoint with
which government disagrees: specifically, that this woman is a despicable
whore because she allowed this picture to be taken. The harm that this speech
causes is, however, so severe that an exception to ordinary free speech
principles is justified.
The Court has declared that no new free speech exceptions can be
considered, ever again. With that declaration, it has transformed the idea of
free speech, one of the great achievements of modern law, into a set of rules to
be blindly followed.
Legal rules inevitably tend to become more definite over time as precedents
accumulate. This growing clarity is valuable. Notice is a central element of the
rule of law. The complex web of free speech rules that the Supreme Court has
crafted is an important safeguard against the abuse of government power, one
that could not be duplicated by vague standards. But these judge-made rules
should not be placed beyond reconsideration.
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See Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81.
See Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 210–11, 230–34
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Roscoe Pound noted more than a century ago the tendency of law to
degenerate into a “mechanical jurisprudence,” to “stifle independent
consideration of new problems and of new phases of old problems, and to
impose the ideas of one generation upon another.”158 The tendency is
inevitable:
The effect of all system is apt to be petrifaction of the subject
systematized. Perfection of scientific system and exposition tends to
cut off individual initiative in the future, to stifle independent
consideration of new problems and of new phases of old problems,
and to impose the ideas of one generation upon another. This is so in
all departments of learning.159

The twentieth-century Court that constructed free speech doctrine was
engaged in the precise creative procedure the present Court deems “startling
and dangerous.” Today’s law purports to be historically grounded but in fact
paradoxically depends for its justification on historical amnesia. Whatever else
one can say about the jurisprudence the Court has constructed, it certainly is
mechanical.
And people, whom free speech is supposed to empower, are being crushed
between the gears.
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Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 606 (1908).
Id.

